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FREE SPEECH, INITIATIVE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
CONFLICT-FOUR ALTERNATIVES TO THE STATE ACTION
REQUIREMENT IN WASHINGTON-Alderwood Associates v.
Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wn. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108
(1981).
An effective right of free speech requires an effective public forum.
Traditionally, the public sidewalks and streets of central business districts
provided such a forum, and the courts declared a constitutional right of
access to these places under the first amendment.' Today, however, the
proliferation of privately owned shopping centers has created a new issue:
Does the traditional right of access to central business districts extend to
privately owned shopping centers-the de facto central business districts
of suburban America?
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the first amend-
ment did not provide such a right. 2 Five years later in Alderwood Associ-
ates v. Washington Environmental Council,3 the Washington Supreme
Court reached the opposite conclusion, declaring that the Washington
Constitution entitles citizens to reasonable use of privately owned shop-
ping centers for the purpose of gathering initiative signatures. 4 A plurality
of the Alderwood justices indicated that the rule should also protect free
speech activities in general. 5
The Alderwood controversy arose in 1980, when members of the
Washington Environmental Council (WEC) solicited initiative signatures
in the Alderwood Mall shopping center. 6 The owners, Alderwood Asso-
1. See, e.g., Haguev. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1938).
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communi-
cating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions.., must not.., be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16. See also infra note 165 and accompanying text (importance of low-cost means of mass
communication).
2. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519-21 (1976).
3. 96 Wn. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
4. Id. at 246, 635 P.2d at 117 (plurality); id. at 253, 635 P.2d at 121 (concurrence).
5. Id. at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
6. Alderwood Associates owns and operates the Alderwood Mall in Lynnwood, Washington.
The Washington Environmental Council is a group of environmentally concerned citizens who partic-
ipated in the "Don't Waste Washington" Committee (DWWC), sponsor of Initiative 383: "The
Radioactive Waste Storage and Transportation Act of 1980." Id. at 232, 635 P.2d at 110. To qualify
an initiative for the November 1980 ballot, the signatures of 123,700 registered voters had to be
collected by July 4, 1980. When this suit began on July 1, 1980, the DWWC had collected approxi-
mately 120,000 signatures. Id. The collection of these signatures was greatly facilitated by the coop-
eration of a number of Puget Sound area shopping centers, which permitted the DWWC to solicit
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ciates, obtained a temporary restraining order which was stayed by the
Court of Appeals and certified to the Washington Supreme Court. 7 In a
4-1-4 decision, the court held that the shopping center owners were not
entitled to a temporary restraining order against the WEC's activities. All
nine justices agreed that the Washington free speech clause only prohibits
state actions that restrict free speech activities.8 Under the state action
analysis currently used by the United States Supreme Court, no state ac-
tion would be present in Alderwood.9 Justice Utter, however, writing for
the Alderwood plurality, reformulated the state action requirement into a
"balancing" test. The plurality thereby characterized the ostensibly pri-
vate actions of Alderwood Associates as state action subject to the Wash-
ington Constitution's free speech and initiative provisions. 10 Justice Dol-
liver concurred only in the result. After rejecting the plurality's state
action analysis, he found an implied quasi-legislative power in citizens to
gather initiative signatures on private property under the initiative provi-
sions of the Washington Constitution, its supplementary statutes and the
related case law. I1
This Note reviews the legal background of the Alderwood controversy,
summarizes the court's opinions and analyzes the approaches taken by the
plurality and concurrence. It argues that Alderwood reached the correct
result, but concludes that neither the plurality nor the concurring opinion
provides a satisfactory justification for that result. Two superior alterna-
tives are proposed: (1) direct balancing, in which the state action require-
ment is explicitly abandoned; 12 and (2) the traditional public function
doctrine, in which the state action requirement is retained, but with an
signatures in their malls. On June 27, 1980, the DWWC sought permission to solicit signatures in the
Alderwood Mall. Alderwood Associates denied their request. Id.
Believing the denial to be unconstitutional, the DWWC proceeded to solicit signatures in the Mall
in an orderly manner. Alderwood Associates did not allege that the petitioners annoyed or harrassed
any Mall patrons or otherwise interfered with the Mall's business activities in any manner. Id. at
231-32, 635 P.2d at 110. The DWWC collected more than 100 signatures per hour until the Superior
Court of Snohomish County issued a temporary restraining order on July 1, 1980.
7. Although the case became moot on July 4, 1980 (the deadline for initiative signature collec-
tion), Washington courts review moot cases in special circumstances. A moot case will be reviewed
in Washington if the issue presented is a matter of continuing and substantial interest, if it presents a
public question likely to recur and if its resolution will help guide the conduct of public officials. Id.
at 233, 635 P.2d at 110. Concluding that this case presented these special circumstances, the Alder-
wood court granted review. Id.
8. Id. at 243-44, 635 P.2d at 116 (plurality); id. at 248-50, 635 P.2d at 118-19 (concurrence);
id. at 253-54, 635 P.2d at 121 (dissent).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 22-31.
10. 96 Wn. 2d at 244-46,635 P.2d at 17.
11. Id. at 247-53, 635 P.2d atI 18-21. See infra note 74. In this Note the provisions of Washing-
ton's Constitution and statutes concerning initiatives and referendums are referred to as "initiative
provisions."
12. See infra notes 128-50 and accompanying text.
Vol. 58:587, 1983
Free Speech, Initiative and Property Rights
exception for private property performing a "traditional public func-
tion. '' 13
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Law: The State Action Requirement
The first amendment to the United States Constitution 14 is applied to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
which commands that "No State shall ...deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."s 5 Consequently, the
United States Supreme Court requires a preliminary demonstration of
state action before evaluating the merits of nonfederal restraints on free
speech. 16 Under traditional first amendment analysis, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that the state deprived the plaintiff of a right, and (2) that
the state lacked a compelling justification for its actions. The first issue is
the preliminary state action test while the second issue requires the court
to balance the competing substantive interests. 17
The public function doctrine provides one of several methods of satis-
fying the preliminary state action requirement when ostensibly private
conduct deprives an individual of constitutional rights. 18 The doctrine
originated in Marsh v. Alabama, 19 in which a privately owned company
town prohibited the distribution of religious leaflets on its property. The
Court sustained a first amendment challenge after finding the requisite
13. See infra notes 151-74 and accompanying text.
14. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. ... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
15. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
16. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). "[Tlhe principle that private
action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well established .... Id. at
349-50. See also infra note 93 (Washington cases describing the state action requirement).
17. See Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action"
Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221,224.
18. G. GINTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 985-87 (10th ed. 1980).
Other methods of satisfying the state action requirement include finding an interdependent or sym-
biotic relationship between the private entity and the state government, see, e.g., Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), or finding extensive government regulation of the private
entity, see, e.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), but see Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (extensive state regulation of electric utility is not, by itself,
sufficient to subject all of utility's actions to the restrictions imposed by the fourteenth amendment).
Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (the fourteenth amendment does not apply to
a private club's racially exclusive practices simply because the state granted the club one of a limited
number of liquor licenses). Further discussion of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this Note.
19. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness sought to distribute religious literature
in the business center of a company-owned town. She was convicted of trespass and appealed on first
amendment grounds. Id. at 503-04.
589
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state action in the "public functions" performed by the company town. 20
Under Marsh, a property owner could not unreasonably restrict the pub-
lic's first amendment rights so long as the property was held open to the
public. 21
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 22 the Court applied Marsh to a modem shopping center.
Finding "striking" similarities between the central business district of a
company town and a suburban shopping center, the Logan Valley Court
applied the public function doctrine of Marsh.23 In Logan Valley, how-
ever, the union claimed a special need for access to the shopping center
because its message related to the labor practices of a store located within
the center. 24 The Court therefore refused to decide whether the first
amendment protected unrelated speech in private shopping centers. 25
The Court addressed the "unrelated speech" issue in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner,26 when citizens protesting the Vietnam War asked for a perma-
nent injunction authorizing them to distribute handbills in a privately
owned shopping center. The Court denied the citizens' request, holding
that unrelated speech is not protected by the first amendment. 27 More-
over, the Court placed a new limit on the public function doctrine, stat-
ing, in dictum, that private property must perform the "full spectrum" of
municipal functions before the doctrine may be invoked. 28
The Lloyd Court's reformulation of the public function doctrine impli-
citly overruled Logan Valley, 29 as the Court acknowledged four years la-
20. See infra note 3 1.
21. "The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it." Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
22. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
23. Id. at 317. "The shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of the business
district ... involved in Marsh." Id. at 318.
24. Id. at 321-23. The shopping center contained the retail outlet of a supermarket employing
nonunion labor. Id. at 311.
25. Id. at 320n.9.
26. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
27. Id. at 564-65.
28. Having distinguished Logan Valley, the Court added in dictum:
[I]t must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free
speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private prop-
erty used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only ....
... Marsh v. Alabama involved the assumption by a private enterprise of all of the attributes
of a state-created municipality and the exercise by that enterprise of semi-official municipal
functions as a delegate of the State. In effect, the owner of the company town was performing
the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State. In the instant case
there is no comparable assumption or exercise of municipal functions or power.
Id. at 567-69 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
29. See id. at 584 (Marshall, J., dissenting):
590
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ter in Hudgens v. NLRB. 30 Thus, at the federal level, the traditional pub-
lic function doctrine of Marsh and Logan Valley, which required only that
the private property perform one public function, 31 has been replaced
with the modern "full spectrum" doctrine articulated in Lloyd and
Hudgens. The "full spectrum" doctrine effectively eliminates federal
protection of free speech in shopping centers.
B. State Law: Assault on the Citadel of State Action
State constitutions provide an independent basis for safeguarding free
speech rights. 32 With increasing frequency, state courts are using state
constitutions to reject federal precedent and provide greater protection for
IT]here is no legitimate way of following Logan Valley and not applying it to this case. But, one
may suspect from reading the opinion of the Court that it is Logan Valley itself that the Court
finds bothersome. The vote in Logan Valley was 6-3, and that decision is only four years old.
But I am aware that the composition of this Court has radically changed in four years. The fact
remains that Logan Valley is binding unless and until it is overruled. There is no valid distinction
between that case and this one, and, therefore, the results in both cases should be the same.
30. 424 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1976). The facts in Hudgens were virtually identical to those in
Logan Valley: Picketers were denied access to a shopping center even though their purpose was to
protest the labor policies of a particular business located in the shopping center. As in Logan Valley,
the picketers in Hudgens apparently claimed a special right of access to the shopping center because
their speech "related" to the particular location picketed. See id. at 509, 512. The Court denied this
claim, inferring that the distinction between related and unrelated speech is irrelevant to state action
analysis. Because Lloyd had already held that the state action requirement was not met when a shop-
ping center prohibited unrelated speech, the Hudgens Court concluded that the requirement could not
be met in a case involving related speech; thus, Lloyd implicitly overruled Logan Valley. Id. at
516-21.
31. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1946). Although the Marsh Court did not
exhaustively catalogue the public functions performed by the company town, the Court indicated that
any property "built and operated primarily to benefit the public" performs a public function. Id. at
506 (referring to "privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads"). Consequently, the Court
implied that both the town and the shopping district within the town performed public functions:
"[T]he town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and
there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the
title to the property belongs to a private corporation." Id. at 503.
32. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."). Even if the provisions of state constitu-
tions were lifted verbatim from the United States Constitution, state courts could openly reject the
prevailing interpretation of the parallel federal provision. State courts enjoy this power because the
United States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review state court decisions that are based on inde-
pendent and adequate state grounds. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 501 n.80 (1977). Justice Brennan noted that "if a state ground is
independent and adequate to support a judgment, the Court has no jurisdiction at all over the decision
despite the presence of federal issues." Id. (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935);
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 590 (1875)). See also Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("It is, of course, well established that a State in the exercise of its
police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not
amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provi-
sion.").
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civil rights. 33 Before Alderwood, three state supreme courts had used
their state constitutions to declare a public right to use certain private
property for free speech purposes. 34 The California Supreme Court led
the way with its landmark 1979 decision, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center.35 In Robins, the California Supreme Court held that the Califor-
nia Constitution's free speech provision protects unrelated speech in
shopping centers. 36 The court relied both on textual differences between
the free speech provisions of the United States and California Constitu-
tions37 and on previous California cases that incorporated the traditional
33. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970); People v. Disbrow, 16
Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d
657 (1971), State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217
N.W.2d 22 (1974); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975); Commonwealth v. Triplett,
462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); Parham v. Municipal Court, 86 S.D. 531, 199 N.W.2d 501
(1972).
In People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), the court stated:
We . . . declare that [the decision to the contrary of the United States Supreme Court] is not
persuasive authority in any state prosecution in California....
... We pause ... to reaffirm the independent nature of the California Constitution and our
responsibility to separately define and protect the rights of California citizens despite conflicting
decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution.
Id. at 113-15,545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
See also infra note 50 (cases in which the Washington Supreme Court has provided greater protec-
tion for civil liberties under the Washington Constitution than is provided by parallel provisions of the
United States Constitution). For general background information about the use of state constitutions
to provide constitutional freedoms exceeding those provided by the United States Constitution, see
Brennan, supra note 32; Falk, Foreword: The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Non-
federal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (1973); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in
the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconsti-
tutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 129-46 (1970); Note, Project Report: Toward an
Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973); Note, The New Fed-
eralism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1977).
34. Since Alderwood, another court has granted free speech access to private property based on a
state constitution. See Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 37 Conn. Supp. 90, 442 A.2d 471 (1982)
(right of access to shopping center to engage in general free speech activities based on the Connecti-
cut Constitution). In addition, a lower court in Washington has granted a preliminary injunction to the
plaintiffs in a suit against a shopping center which refused to allow unpaid volunteers to advocate
voter registration and to register voters in the shopping center. King County Democratic Cent.
Comm. v. Bellevue Square Managers, Inc., No. 82-2-13817-7 (King County Super. Ct. May 16,
1983) (order granting preliminary injunction).
35. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See
generally Note, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to Shopping Centers
Under the California Constitution, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 641 (1980); Note, Robins v. Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center: Federalism and State Protection of Free Speech, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 805 (1980).
36. Robins involved a group of high school students protesting a United Nations resolution
against "Zionism" by soliciting signatures in a privately owned shopping center. They were not
permitted to do so. The students sought and obtained a permanent injunction granting them reason-
able access to the center. Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 902-03, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
37. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of
592
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public function doctrine. 38 Thus, the Robins court appeared to adopt the
traditional public function doctrine. The shopping center owners appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the Robins result vio-
lated the owners' property and free speech rights under the United States
Constitution. The Court, however, rejected these arguments and unani-
mously upheld Robins as a valid exercise of state power. 39
The New Jersey Supreme Court followed the lead of Robins in State v.
Schmid.40 The Schmid court recognized a right to distribute political
material on the private property of Princeton University based on the free
speech provision of the New Jersey Constitution. 41 It read this provision
as both an affirmative guarantee of free speech and a specific prohibition
of government restraints on free speech. 42 The court thus abandoned any
state action requirement for cases involving private property held open to
the public43 and adopted direct balancing for these cases.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also adopted direct balancing in
speech or press.") with U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech .... ").
38. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) (holding
that Vietnam war protestors had a right to distribute leaflets in the privately owned L.A. Union Sta-
tion).
39. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). The shopping center's owners
made three arguments to the United States Supreme Court: (1) that Lloyd was binding on the states
because it allegedly recognized a federally protected property right of shopping centers to exclude
.persons ... [seeking to] exercise their state constitutional rights of free speech and petition when
adequate alternative avenues of communication are available," id. at 80; (2) that a "right to exclude
others underlies the Fifth Amendment guarantee against the taking of property without just compen-
sation and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against the deprivation of property without due pro-
cess of law," id. at 82; and (3) that a private property owner has a first amendment right "not to be
forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others," id. at 85. The United
States Supreme Court unanimously rejected these arguments as applied to the facts in Pruneyard,
although four justices (Blackmun, Marshall, White and Powell) filed separate concurring opinions.
40. 84 N.J. 535,423 A.2d 615(1980).
41. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press." N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6.
42. 423 A.2d at 628.
43. 423 A.2d at 628-29. The Schmid court concluded that:
[T]he State Constitution furnishes to individuals the complementary freedoms of speech and
assembly and protects the reasonable exercise of those rights. These guarantees . . . are ...
available against ... private entities that have otherwise assumed a constitutional obligation not
to abridge the individual exercise of such freedoms because of the public use of their property
... [A]s private property becomes, on a sliding scale, committed either more or less to public
use and enjoyment, there is actuated, in effect, a counterbalancing between expressional and
property rights.
Id. See also id. at 639 (Schreiber, J., concurring) ("[T]he New Jersey constitutional guarantee of free
speech is not circumscribed by the need to find state action.").
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Commonwealth v. Tate,44 decided shortly before Alderwood. In Tate, the
court recognized a right under the free speech provision of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution45 to distribute political leaflets, in a reasonable manner,
on the property of a private college. 46 Because the free speech provision
was not restricted by a state action requirement, 47 Pennsylvania courts
could "in certain circumstances . . . reasonably restrict the right to pos-
sess and use property in the interests of freedom of speech, assembly, and
petition.' '48
II. THE ALDERWOOD COURT'S REASONING
The nine justices in Alderwood unanimously agreed that Washington
could provide its citizens with civil rights surpassing those recognized by
the federal constitution. 49 The justices disagreed, however, whether the
Washington Constitution's free speech and initiative provisions incorpo-
rated the traditional state action test, a reformulated state action test or no
test at all.
A. The Plurality
The plurality's analysis began by emphasizing that the Washington Su-
preme Court had recently interpreted the Washington Constitution to pro-
vide greater protection for individual rights than its federal counterpart. 50
The plurality viewed the traditional state action requirement as another
legal bottleneck which needed the ability to expand to allow for "the
changing conditions of modem life." 51
44. 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382(1981).
45. "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man,
and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty." PA, CONST. art. 1, § 7.
46. 432A.2dat 1391.
47. "[Tihe rights of freedom of speech, assembly, and petition have been guaranteed since the
first Pennsylvania Constitution, not simply as restrictions on the powers of government, as found in
the Federal Constitution, but as inherent and 'invaluable' rights of man." Id. at 1388.
48. Id. at 1390.
49. 96 Wn. 2d at 237, 635 P.2d at 108 (plurality); id. at 250, 635 P.2d at 119 (concurrence); id.
at 253, 635 P.2d at 121 (dissent).
50. Id. at 238, 635 P.2d at 113. See also State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170, 177, 622 P.2d 1199,
1204 (1980) (search and seizure); State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 392, 617 P.2d 720, 723 (1980) (cruel
and unusual punishment); State v. Hehman, 90 Wn. 2d 45, 49, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (1978) (search and
seizure); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn. 2d 859, 868, 540 P.2d 882, 888 (1975) (sex discrimination).
51. 96 Wn. 2d at 239, 635 P.2d at 113. The plurality noted that:
At the time of Marsh v. Alabama ... the concept of shopping malls had yet to be developed.
Then, most public forums were located in downtown business districts, whereas now people
spend more time in shopping centers than anywhere else, excepting their home and job. The law
concerning free speech has to a large degree evolved from a period where town centers were the
Vol. 58:587, 1983
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The plurality therefore reformulated the state action requirement from a
test requiring active government involvement in the private action52 to a
test balancing free speech, initiative and property rights. The plurality
justified its reformulation by noting that the Washington Constitution's
free speech provision "is not by its express terms limited to governmental
actions. 53 It further noted that the Washington free speech provision is
similar to both California's 54 and New Jersey's 55 where state supreme
courts have "rejected the 'state action' requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' '56 The plurality thus chose to follow the approach of Cali-
fornia and New Jersey "which recognizes that the 'state action' analysis
of the Fourteenth Amendment was required by the language of the fed-
eral, but not the state, constitution. 57
Nevertheless, the plurality refused to abandon completely the state ac-
tion requirement. It believed that retaining some form of state action re-
quirement is essential, because without it "every private conflict involv-
ing speech and property rights would become a constitutional dispute." 5 8
This, the plurality argued, would unfairly restrict property rights59 and
would be inconsistent with the balancing approach generally employed in
resolving conflicts between free speech and property rights. 60
only public forums. Because the nature of the public forum has changed, it is necessary to reas-
sess the underpinnings for the existing free speech principles.
Id. at 239, 635 P.2d at 114 (citations omitted).
52. See infra note 93.
53. 96 Wn. 2d at 240, 635 P.2d at 114. Compare WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 5 ("Every person may
freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.") with
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... ").
54. The plurality noted that the Washington Constitution's free speech provision was derived
from California's provision. 96 Wn. 2d at 241, 635 P.2d at 114 (citing A. BEARDSLEY, NOTES ON THE
SOURCES OFTHE VASHINGTON CONSTTrTmON, 1889-1939, reprinted in CONsTTrUTION OFTHE STATE OF
WASHINGTON app. 4-6 (1939)). Compare WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 5 ("Every person may freely speak,
write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.") with CALIF. CONST.
art. I, § 2 ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or
press."). See also supra notes 14 (U.S. CONST. free speech clause), 41 (N.J. CONST. free speech
clause) and 45 (PA. CONST. free speech clause).
55. See supra note 41.
56. 96 Wn. 2d at 243, 635 P.2d at 116. See also supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text
(description of California and New Jersey cases).
57. 96 Wn. 2d at 241, 635 P.2d at 115-16. See also supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text
(description of California and New Jersey cases).
58. 96 Wn. 2d at 241,635 P.2d at 116.
59. See infra note 98.
60. 96 Wn. 2d at 243-44, 635 P.2d at 116. The plurality stated that:
Although we read [Washington Constitution] section 5 and amendment 7 as not requiring the
same "state action" as the Fourteenth Amendment, that does not mean those provisions are
applicable to all speech and initiative activities. If there were no limitations to their application,
every private conflict involving speech and property rights would become a constitutional dis-
pute .... Such an approach would deny private autonomy and property rights in the same way
Washington Law Review Vol. 58:587, 1983
The plurality thus retained the state action requirement but reformu-
lated it from a test requiring active government involvement in the osten-
sibly private action into a preliminary "judicial balancing of competing
interests." 61 Under this reformulation a court first balances "the merits":
the conflicting speech, initiative and property rights. 62 If this balance fa-
vors judicial intervention to protect the speech or initiative right, then
state action is present. 63 If state action is present, the court decides the
case as if the property were owned and operated by the government. 64
Unless the property owner can overcome the "heavy presumption" that
its actions violate the constitution, the property owner loses. 65
as the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment denies free speech. To endorse
either approach would ignore the validity of certain constitutional rights and would be inconsis-
tent with the balancing approach generally employed in resolving First Amendment and property
right conflicts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
61. Id. at 242, 635 P.2d at 115. Although no court has openly endorsed the balancing approach
to state action, advocates of the theory argue that most courts, particularly the United States Supreme
Court, implicitly decide cases using this approach. See. e.g., Glennon & Nowak, supra note 17, at
226-27. Glennon and Nowak argue that the current formulations of the state action requirement used
by the United States Supreme Court are mere legal fictions used by the Court to dispose formally of
cases which are actually decided by secretly balancing the merits of each controversy.
When a case involves a challenge to a practice that is not an official government action, it only
appears that there is an additional issue regarding state action. There is but a single ultimate
issue in both types of cases: Does the Amendment proscribe the challenged practice? The addi-
tional issue in the private practice case merely provides another way of answering the ultimate
question. . . . Therefore, a judicial decision focusing on the existence of state action . . . is
merely the Court's chosen manner of determining whether the challenged nongovernmental act
is compatible with the substantive guarantees of the Amendment.
Id. at 228-29 (emphasis added).
62. Although the plurality stated that courts should balance "all the interests" involved, 96 Wn.
2d at 244, 635 P.2d at 116, it identified what it considered the four most important factors: (I) the use
and nature of the property; (2) the nature of the speech activity; (3) the potential for reasonable regu-
lation of the speech activity; and (4) the possibility of violating the property owner's first and four-
teenth amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Id. at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 116-17.
Regarding the fourth factor, see supra note 39.
63. See 96 Wn. 2d at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 116-17. The plurality argued that the United States
Supreme Court implicitly uses a balancing approach to state action questions, but that the Court's
balancing involves two factors which are inappropriate when state courts interpret state constitutions.
The first factor is best termed "interstate variation." Because the United States Supreme Court must
fashion a rule that will operate satisfactorily in all regions of the country, its balancing inevitably
tends toward the lowest common denominator. The second factor is federalism. Because the four-
teenth amendment establishes a level of civil rights below which the states cannot go, the United
States Supreme Court must conservatively interpret its scope. If the level of civil rights is set too high
the advantages of state autonomy and experimentation which derive from a federalist system are lost.
Id. at 242-43, 635 P.2d at 115. See infra note 89.
64. 96 Wn. 2d at 246, 635 P.2d at 117 ("Since the balance favors the free speech and initiative
activity, section 5 and amendment 7 are applicable.").
65. Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 74 Wn. 2d 503,506,445 P.2d 602, 604 (1968). See
also infra note 96 (description of strict scrutiny analysis).
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Applying this doctrine to the Alderwood facts, the plurality concluded
that the balance favored the speech and initiative activities of the Wash-
ington Environmental Council (WEC). This satisfied the state action re-
quirement 66 andalso made it impossible for Alderwood Associates to re-
but the heavy presumption that its actions were unconstitutional. 67 In
balancing the conflicting interests, the plurality reasoned that, on the one
hand, the constitutional rights of the shopping center owners were not
violated by the WEC's activities. 68 On the other hand, "to bar this ac-
tivity would significantly undermine free speech and particularly the ef-
fectiveness of the initiative process.' '69 The plurality therefore concluded
that the Washington Constitution entitles citizens to engage in reasonable
free speech and initiative activities in privately owned shopping centers. 70
B. The Concurrence
Justice Dolliver, concurring, argued that the plurality used an irrele-
vant textual distinction between the state and federal free speech provi-
sions to negate what he considered the longstanding, universally recog-
nized, state action limitation on free speech rights under the Washington
Constitution. 71 Justice Dolliver further argued that, by effectively elimi-
nating the state action test, the plurality vastly expanded the scope of judi-
cial power to the detriment of democratic principles. 72
Justice Dolliver nevertheless agreed with the plurality's result. He dis-
tinguished initiative powers from free speech rights, 73 and found an im-
66. 96 Wn. 2d at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
67. After concluding that the state action requirement was satisfied because the balance favored
the citizens' speech and initiative rights, see supra note 64, the plurality decided the merits of the
case in one sentence: "Given that a municipality could not have barred petitioners' actions, we con-
clude that they were permissible and thus that the temporary restraining order was improperly
granted." Id. at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
68. Id. at 245-46 & n.9, 635 P.2d at 117 & n.9. The plurality noted that the facts of Alderwood
compared favorably with those in Pruneyard, in which the United States Supreme Court rejected
similar arguments. See supra note 39.
69. Id. at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
70. Id.
71. "There is nothing in our constitution, in our constitutional history, in the opinions of this
court or in the writings of commentators on our constitution which gives credence to the position of
the [plurality]." Id. at 249-50, 635 P.2d at 119.
72. Justice Dolliver argued that courts should stay within their traditional role of protecting citi-
zens from the potential oppression of the state, allowing the legislature to fulfill its traditional role of
resolving conflicts among citizens. Id. at 250-51, 635 P.2d at 119. "Now there is no limit to the
range of wrongs which this court may right-subject only to the court's notion of balancing interests.
With the acceptance of the [plurality] position, the need for a statute .. . can be set aside for the
beneficent guardianship of the state courts." Id. at 251, 635 P.2d at 119.
73. Justice Dolliver argued that initiative powers are not rights against the government, like free
speech rights, but are instead "a declaration by the people ... that they are a part of the legislative
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plied power to gather initiative signatures on private property under the
constitutional provision conferring initiative powers on Washington citi-
zens, its supplementary statutes and the related case law. 74 Emphasizing
the "overriding public interest" in an effective initiative process, 75 Jus-
tice Dolliver claimed that these provisions should be "liberally con-
strued" to recognize the inherent police power of all citizens to make
reasonable use of private property when gathering initiative signatures. 76
Because the initiative provision gives citizens powers, not rights, 77 he
argued that it is not constrained by a state action requirement. 78 He con-
cluded that citizens may exercise their initiative powers "as may other
aspects of government, only in such a way as not to restrict the use of
private property so as to amount to a taking." 79 Because Justice Dol-
liver's approach eliminates any state action requirement for initiative
"powers," it is essentially a limited form of direct balancing in which the
balancing is restricted to initiative and property rights. 80
C. The Dissent
The dissent agreed with Justice Dolliver that the plurality, in effect,
eliminated the state action test.81 It conceded that the state has the power
to regulate private property for the purpose of enhancing free speech or
initiative rights. 82 The dissent, however, denied that existing Washington
law authorized such regulation, 83 and argued that, in the absence of spe-
cific constitutional language or legislative action, individuals had no right
process." Id. at 253, 635 P.2d at 120. As part of the government, the people possess a police power
to impose reasonable restrictions on the autonomy of property owners. Id. at 253, 635 P.2d at 120.
74. Justice Dolliver cited WASH. CONST. art. II, § l(a) (creating citizens' initiative and referen-
dum powers), WASH. REV. CODE ch. 29.79 (supplementary statute defining more specifically the
various aspects of the initiative process) and related cases (cited infra in note 114). 96 Wn. 2d at 251,
635 P.2d at 120. The plurality agreed that citizens possess an independent right to gather initiative
signatures on private property under the initiative provision of the Washington Constitution. See id.
at 239, 243, 246, 635 P.2d at 114, 117. However, the plurality emphasized its arguments based on
the free speech clause and did not comment on Justice Dolliver's analysis. See id. at 239-46, 635
P.2d at 114-17.
75. Id. at 252, 635 P.2d at 120.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 73.
78. See 96 Wn. 2d at 252-53, 635 P.2d at 120.
79. Id. at 253, 635 P.2d at 120.
80. See infra note 112.
81. 96 Wn. 2d at 254,635 P.2d at 121.
82. Id. at 253-54, 635 P.2d at 121.
83. Id. at 254, 635 P.2d at 121. "If the State had in any manner imposed ... a restriction (on
property rights to facilitate free speech or initiative rights] I would reverse the trial court, but no such
limitation has ever been enacted." Id.
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to use privately owned shopping centers for free speech or initiative activ-
ities. 84
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Plurality's Balancing Approach to State Action
The concurrence and dissent correctly concluded that the plurality's re-
formulation of the state action requirement effectively eliminates it as a
limitation on the scope of free speech and initiative rights. As noted
above, under traditional first amendment analysis a plaintiff must demon-
strate: (1) that the state acted to deprive the plaintiff of a first amendment
right, and (2) that the state lacked a compelling justification for its ac-
tions. 85
The first issue is the preliminary state action requirement. As tradition-
ally formulated, it turns on a question of causality: Did the state cause or
substantially contribute to the alleged constitutional deprivation? This de-
termination is logically prior to and independent of the judicial balancing
of the competing interests. That balancing occurs only if state action is
present. 86 As reformulated by the plurality, 87 however, the state action
determination turns on a balancing of the same interests that the court
traditionally considered only after finding causal state action. Under the
plurality's approach, the merits determine whether state action is present,
effectively eliminating any independent state action requirement. Indeed,
in the article cited by the plurality to justify its balancing approach, 88 the
authors frankly admitted that under this approach the state action require-
ment no longer has any "intrinsic meaning as a formalized test.' '89
84. See id. at 253-54, 635 P.2d at 121.
85. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
86. See Glennon & Nowak, supra note 17, at 224.
87. See 96 Wn. 2d at 242, 244, 246, 635 P.2d at 115-17.
88. 96 Wn. 2d at 242, 635 P.2d at 115.
89. Glennon & Nowak, supra note 17, at 261. Glennon and Nowak argued that past cases in-
volving state action are best explained by a functional analysis which frankly recognizes the empty
fiction of the state action test. Id. at 232-59. The professors advocated a new balancing approach to
state action both because of its superior predictive ability and because it would clearly illustrate the
intrinsic uselessness of the state action concept. Their argument was based on the premise that there is
no such thing as a "neutral" law. Instead, laws are inherently positive actions in that they necessarily
place the power of the state behind one of the parties to a controversy. Thus, Glennon and Nowak
concluded that whenever the law provides a remedy that one party may use against another, such as a
trespass statute, the state acts in the same manner as when it prosecutes an individual for a crime.
Although the government is more actively involved in the latter instance, in both cases the govern-
ment acts to enforce a legal rule.
If the practice limits the existence of the right and the practice is lawful, then the state has at
some point chosen to define the challenged practice as the superior right. This is true whether the
state has explicitly authorized the challenged practice or simply allowed it to exist. The only
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Yet the plurality denied that its reformulation eliminated the state ac-
tion requirement; instead, the plurality agreed with the dissent and con-
currence that eliminating the test would be undesirable. 90 These state-
ments appear to contradict the plurality's balancing approach to the state
action requirement, which in fact eliminated the requirement as tradition-
ally defined. The plurality attempted to reconcile these apparently con-
tradictory statements by radically redefining state action. A majority of
the Alderwood justices-the concurrence 91 and dissent92-used the term
"state action" as it is traditionally understood: as a reference to actions of
a government agency, or to private actions that are substantially in-
tertwined with the actions of a government agency. 93 The Alderwood plu-
difference is that in the latter alternative the state has legitimized the practice through its com-
mon law rather than by specific statutory enactment.
Id. at 230.
But see Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wn. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, review denied, 94 Wn. 2d 1014
(1980). The Stephanus court implicitly rejected Glennon and Nowak's analysis as follows:
The constitution, however, does not prohibit a private person's infringement of another's First
Amendment rights. It forbids only such infringements which may properly be attributable to the
State ....
As a general rule, the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied
where the State is significantly intertwined with the acts of the private parties ....
Conventionally, there is thought to be a line somewhere between two "polar propositions":
that under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not deprive a person of his constitutional
rights; and that a person may for any reason discriminate against other persons in his private
affairs. . . . With the "state action" pole are associated such phrases as "'state compulsion or
involvement," and with the opposite pole, state "neutrality" and "purely private" or "merely
private" conduct. In attempting to sort out these phrases, we recognize that in the broadest
senses of the words, the states are always involved in private actions, are never pristinely neu-
tral.
... [Sitate action under the Fourteenth Amendment should not be extended into every private
dispute which winds up in a state court. That notion would be entirely undermined if we found
state action in the mere enforcement of a judgment where we could find no state action in the
judgment itself.
Id. at 335-39, 613 P.2d at 539-41. Accord, Long v. Chiropractic Soc'y, 93 Wn. 2d 757, 761, 613
P.2d 124, 127 (1980) (quoted infra in note 93).
90. See supra note 60.
91. 96 Wn. 2d at 248, 635 P.2d at 118 ("this is the first time the court has held the Declaration of
Rights in our constitution is designed not just to protect the individual from government but that it
may also be used by one individual against the other").
92. Id. at 254, 635 P.2d at 121 ("the 'state action' requirement . . . now appears to have been
abrogated").
93. See In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 121, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983) ("The existence of 'state
action' for constitutional purposes depends on 'whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself.' ") (citation omitted); Long v. Chiropractic Soc'y, 93 Wn. 2d 757,
761-62, 613 P.2d 124, 127 (1980). The Long court stated that:
Over the course of a century of case-by-case application, the [United States] Supreme Court
has developed the "state action" doctrine.... The court has, in the course of time, enlarged
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rality, however, defined state action as a "judicial balancing of compet-
ing interests. "94
Thus, when the plurality stated that it would be unwise to eliminate the
state action requirement, 95 the plurality did not mean that it wanted to
retain a test requiring a causal connection to government actions. Instead,
it only meant that it would be unwise for courts to scrutinize all private
restrictions on free speech in the same manner that they scrutinize similar
government restrictions. Under the doctrine commonly referred to as
"strict scrutiny" courts presume that all government restraints on funda-
mental rights, such as free speech, are unconstitutional; courts will up-
hold these restraints only if the government demonstrates that they are
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 96
Yet the danger to our civil liberties flowing from most private restric-
tions on speech are trivial When contrasted with those flowing from gov-
ernment restrictions. 97 Moreover, judicial interference with individual
autonomy is itself a threat to liberty. If the judiciary attempted to review
strictly all private actions that incidentally restrain another person's
"rights," the attempt alone would significantly erode important liberties
such as individual autonomy and freedom of association. 98 As the plu-
state action to encompass "private" conduct under certain circumstances. But the state must be
involved, and the test is significant state involvement....
... [W]e recognize a constitutional distinction between active and passive state involvement.
Active involvement may invoke constitutional protection; passive involvement does not. Simple
enactment of a statute permitting, but not requiring, private conduct with no further significant
participation by the state is not state action.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wn. App. 326, 334-342, 613 P.2d 533,
538-42, review denied, 94 Wn. 2d 1014 (1980) (quoted supra at the end of note 89).
94. 96Wn. 2dat242,635P.2dat115.
95. Id. at 243-44, 635 P.2d at 116 (quoted supra in note 60).
96. State v. Conifer Enters., 82 Wn. 2d 94, 508 P.2d 149 (1973). The Conifer court stated that:
[Any legislative restraint imposed upon a First Amendment freedom "comes into court bearing
a heavy presumption against its constitutionality."
.. "[O]nly a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's consti-
tutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." And, the requisite
connection between the statute and the permissible state interest is necessity; a mere rational,
reasonable, or even substantial relationship will not suffice.
Id. at 99, 508 P.2d at 152-53 (citations omitted).
97. For example, should it be unconstitutional for a parent to tell his or her teenage child not to
discuss birth control devices during dinner unless the parent can demonstrate that the restriction on
the child's free speech rights is necessary to achieve a compelling parental interest? Or should it be
unconstitutional for an employer to prohibit the telling of racist or sexist jokes during working hours
unless the employer's justifications can survive strict judicial scrutiny?
98. See Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wn. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533, review denied, 94 Wn. 2d
1014 (1980). The Stephanus court reasoned that:
[T]he state action requirement is more than just a limitation on state power. It also protects the
right to freedom from governmental interference with private conduct. A finding of state action
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rality correctly noted, subjecting all private restrictions on speech to the
same strict judicial scrutiny currently given government actions would
"deny private automony and property rights in the same way as the 'state
action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment denies free speech. "99
The plurality viewed the state action requirement as a screening device
limiting strict judicial scrutiny to those cases which pose the greatest dan-
ger to fundamental rights. Government restrictions on fundamental rights
have long been recognized as posing such a danger. 100 With the prolifera-
tion of privately owned shopping centers, however, some private actors
possess the power to restrict substantially the exercise of fundamental
rights in contemporary society. 101 The plurality's reformulation of state
action as a balancing of competing interests represents an attempt to au-
thorize strict judicial scrutiny of private restrictions on fundamental rights
only in those relatively few cases in which judicial intervention is neces-
sary to prevent a significant erosion of those rights.
The result sought by the plurality is laudable. The courts need to de-
velop doctrines which provide remedies for those purely private actions
that substantially restrict fundamental freedoms. 102 But the plurality's
method of achieving that result is defective for two reasons. First, the
plurality's reformulation of the state action doctrine was needlessly
confusing. "State action" denotes government action, and the doctrine
has long been viewed as requiring active government involvement, not
merely the passive government action involved whenever a court enforces
a facially neutral law. 103 Yet the plurality's reformulation of state action
did not require active government involvement. Thus, it is difficult to
discern what the plurality actually intended when it pointedly retained a
"state action" requirement, but did not require any active government
involvement before courts could balance the competing interests of a
case. The more cynical observers of the judicial process might well con-
in this case would emasculate this purpose of the state action requirement by subjecting all pri-
vate conduct which results in litigation to the broad restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 340-41,613 P.2d at 542 (citations omitted).
99. 96Wn.2dat243,635P.2dat 116.
100. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon
Papers" case) (prior restraint held unconstitutional); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act held unconstitutional); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938) (city ordinance requiring license to distribute literature held unconstitutional). See also Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (city's prohibition of protests on public streets and sidewalks held
unconstitutional).
101. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
102. See infra note 135.
103. See supra note 93. See, e.g., Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wn. App. 326, 613 P.2d 533,
review denied, 94 Wn. 2d 1014 (1980) (landlord's use of unlawful detainer statute to terminate ten-
ant's possession of apartment does not involve state action; thus, fact that landlord's motive was to
retaliate for tenant's free speech activities was irrelevant).
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clude that the plurality sought to create the appearance of precedential
continuity while in fact adopting an entirely different approach. The plu-
rality should have instead stated that it was eliminating the state action
requirement as traditionally defined and was replacing it with a different
requirement-one that, like the state action requirement, shields most pri-
vate actions from strict judicial scrutiny, but unlike the state action re-
quirement, authorizes judicial review of those private actions which sig-
nificantly undermine fundamental rights.
The second defect in the plurality's approach was that, when combined
with strict scrutiny, it contained a redundant analytical step. The state
action requirement is an independent, preliminary requirement which
must be satisfied before a court strictly scrutinizes the action restricting a
fundamental right. Under the plurality's reformulation of state action,
however, the preliminary requirement is a balancing of the competing in-
terests. If the "preliminary" balancing favors judicial intervention to pro-
tect the fundamental right, the court then strictly scrutinizes the private
action. To survive strict scrutiny, the actor must demonstrate that its ac-
tions are necessary to achieve a compelling interest. 104 But once a court
decides that a balancing of the interests favors judicial intervention, it has
already decided that the actions were unnecessary to achieve a compelling
interest. Thus, the plurality's "preliminary" test is, in fact, the only
meaningful test; if it is met the court must necessarily declare that the
private actions restricting free speech are unconstitutional. 105
The plurality's ambiguously expressed fear was that, without some
kind of preliminary screening device, courts would strictly scrutinize and
thus almost always strike down all private restrictions on free speechl 06 in
the same manner that courts almost always strike down government re-
strictions on free speech. 107 The best way to alleviate this concern, how-
ever, is simply to eliminate the state action requirement, and apply a
lesser degree of judicial scrutiny to private restrictions on free speech.
Courts would thus restrain private actions only if the free speech interests
clearly outweigh the private autonomy or property interests. This "direct
balancing" approach' 08 achieves exactly the same results as the plu-
rality's reformulation of state action. 109 The difference is that direct bal-
ancing avoids the confusion and redundancy inherent in the plurality's
104. See supra note 96.
105. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 60.
107. See, e.g., supra note 100.
108. See infra part IIIC1 (analysis of direct balancing).
109. Under both the plurality's approach and direct balancing, the results are as follows: When a
balance of the conflicting interests favors the free speech interests, those interests will prevail; other-
wise, the private autonomy and property interests will prevail.
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approach. But before analyzing direct balancing in greater depth, this
Note evaluates the concurrence's attempt to resolve the Alderwood con-
troversy.
B. The Concurrence's Police Power Approach
Concurring only in the result, Justice Dolliver concluded that citizens
possess a right to "gather signatures in a manner which does not violate
or unreasonably restrict the rights of private property owners." 110 Ac-
cording to Justice Dolliver, this separate right flows from the initiative
provision of the Washington Constitution, its supplementary statutes and
prior case law. I ll Because Justice Dolliver argued that the initiative pro-
vision does not require a demonstration of state action, he essentially ad-
vocated a limited form of direct balancing. 112 Under this approach a court
decides a case by directly balancing the relevant interests, which, under
Justice Dolliver's analysis, are limited to initiative and property rights.
Justice Dolliver's justifications for adopting this limited form of direct
balancing are unsatisfactory. Neither the constitutional nor the statutory
provisions cited by Justice Dolliver contain a single clause referring to the
method by which citizens may gather signatures. 113 Justice Dolliver's ap-
peal to case law is similarly unpersuasive because none of the cases cited
relate to the authorized locations or permissible methods for gathering
initiative signatures. 114 Thus, by itself, Justice Dolliver's appeal to the
110. 96Wn.2dat253,635P.2dat 121.
11. See id. at 251, 635 P.2d at 120. See supra note 74; infra note 114.
112. There are three forms of direct balancing: (1) direct balancing of speech, initiative and
property rights (the broadest form and, in effect, the result of the Alderwood plurality's balancing
approach to state action); (2) direct balancing of initiative and property rights (a limited form and, in
effect, the result of the concurrence's approach if one ignores its "police power" gloss); and (3)
direct balancing of speech and property rights (also a limited form, but not adopted by any of the
justices in Aldervood). See generally infra part IIICI (analysis of direct balancing).
113. See WASH CONST. art. I, § l(a)-(b) (creating citizens' initiative and referendum powers);
WASH, REV CODE ch. 29.79 (1981) (supplementary statute defining more specifically the various
aspects of the initiative process).
114. 96 Wn. 2d at 251-52, 635 P.2d at 120. The cases cited by the concurrence all concern
executive or legislative actions contrary to the specific administrative requirements of the supplemen-
tary initiative statutes; none addressed the permissible methods of gathering initiative signatures. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Evich v. Superior Court, 188 Wash. 19, 61 P.2d 143 (1936) (initiative could not be
placed on ballot when secretary of state did not determine validity of signatures on petition); State ex
rel. Booth v. Hinkle, 148 Wash. 445, 269 P. 818 (1928) (time limit for filing opinions for voter's
pamphlet held inadequate); State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 147 P. 11 (1915) (legisla-
tive declaration of "emergency" allowing immediate implementation of a law held invalid because
there was no true emergency, and people must have opportunity to void the law by using their refer-
endum power); State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 P. 461 (1914) (secretary of
state may not invalidate initiative signatures after the signatures have been certified by precinct offi-
cials).
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need for liberal construction of the initiative provision 15 added little to
his argument.
To bridge the gulf between the text of the initiative provision and his
conclusion, Justice Dolliver relied primarily on an analogy between citi-
zens' initiative powers and the legislature's police power. 116 This argu-
ment, however, relies on an incorrect interpretation of the police power
doctrine. Properly understood, the police power doctrine applies only to
the legitimate scope of legislation which has already been enacted, not to
the legitimate means of enacting legislation. 117 This power can therefore
no more justify a citizen's unauthorized use of private property than the
legislature's police power can justify a legislator's use, without statutory
authority, of an empty office building to conduct a public hearing.
Even if one accepts Justice Dolliver's police power analogy, his ap-
proach is less desirable than the plurality's for three reasons. First, if one
adds a "police power gloss" to the otherwise limited form of direct bal-
ancing articulated by the concurrence, the approach is more threatening to
property rights than the plurality's approach. The police power doctrine
would require courts to decide conflicts between initiative and property
rights according to "takings" law. 118 Under takings law, the interference
115. 96 Wn. 2d at 252, 635 P.2d at 120.
116. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
117. See BLACK'S LAWDeIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979):
[Plolice power. An authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth
Amendment, U.S. Const., upon the individual states, and, in turn, delegated to local govern-
ments, through which they are enabled to... adopt such laws and regulations as tend to...
secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its [sic] citizens ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 88 Wn. 2d 726,
731-34, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (1977) (upholding flood control zoning statute as valid exercise of
police power); State v. Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551, 559, 202 P.2d 906, 910 (" '[T]he police power [is]
the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances ... as they [sic] shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth .... ) (emphasis added; citations omitted), affd mem.,
338 U.S. 863 (1949).
In support of his police power analysis, Justice Dolliver cited both Maple Leaf and Dexter. 96 Wn.
2d at 252, 635 P.2d at 120. Both of those cases involved challenges to statutes and regulations which
had already been enacted, and did not involve the process of enacting legislation or regulations. See
Maple Leaf, 88 Wn. 2d at 729-30, 565 P.2d at 1163-64Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d at 553,202 P.2d at 907.
118. The only limits on the legislative police power are that it must reasonably promote a valid
interest and may not violate a specific constitutional limitation. Alderwood, 96 Wn. 2d at 252, 635
P.2d at 120 (Dolliver, J., concurring); State v. Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551,554, 202 P.2d 906, 907, affld
mem., 338 U.S. 863 (1949). Collecting initiative signatures is clearly a valid interest to citizens
engaged in an initiative campaign. Thus, whenever a citizen could prove that the use of private prop-
erty would help gather more signatures, the citizen could argue persuasively that such use promoted a
valid interest.
The police power approach, in effect, makes each citizen an administrative agency with a grant of
legislative power to regulate all private property, so long as that regulation reasonably assists in the
gathering of initiative signatures. Property owners' first amendment right not to speak would limit
this exercise of citizen police power, but this limitation applies only in extreme situations. See Prune-
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with property rights necessary to constitute an unconstitutional "taking"
can be quite substantial,1 19 and would almost certainly exceed that re-
quired in any direct judicial balancing of speech, initiative and property
rights. 120
Second, takings law is notoriously unpredictable because the courts
"decide each case on its own facts."'' Although Justice Dolliver
seemed to depart from takings analysis by limiting his holding to "rea-
sonable" restrictions on private property, 122 there is a vast difference be-
tween a restriction that strikes a reasonable balance between speech and
yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980); id. at 99-101 (Powell, J., concurring).
Thus, the only meaningful limitation on citizens' police power would be the takings provisions of the
State and United States Constitutions. See WASH. CONST. art I, § 16 ("No private property shall be
taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation .... "); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ); U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.").
119. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Court
noted that:
[T]he decisions sustaining other land-use regulations, which, like the New York City law, are
reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that
diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a "taking," see Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% dimunition in value caused by zoning law); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87 2% dimunition in value); ... and that the "taking" issue in
these contexts is resolved by focusing on the uses the regulations permit.
Id. at 131. See also Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wn. 2d 905, 919-20, 602
P.2d 1177, 1186-87 (1979), appeal denied, 449 U.S. 804 (1980) (city ordinance required disman-
tling of billboards in certain locations without compensation to billboard owners; held, no taking);
Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wn. 2d 405, 427, 439 P.2d 248, 261 (1968), appeal denied,
393 U.S. 316 (1969) (same).
120. Under takings law, the issue is not whether the government interest is sufficient to outweigh
the interference with property as it is under a simple balancing approach. Instead, the issue is whether
the government interest is valid and, if so, whether the property owner has been so substantially
deprived of one or more of the "essential sticks in the bundle of [property] rights" as to constitute a
taking of property without compensation. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
See also Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 88 Wn. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977).
The Maple Leaf court described Washington's takings law as follows:
[T~he judicial reasoning involved in a determination of the issue of police power versus condem-
nation is not reduced to a precise formula, nor is it capable of being so handled. There is no
single, simple test to use in dealing with the taking issue. The court, guided by broad general
principles, must decide each case on its own facts ....
The question essentially is one of social policy which requires the balancing of the public
interest in regulating the use of private property against the interests of private landowners not to
be encumbered by restrictions on the use of their property.
Id. at 731, 565 P.2d at 1164.
121. Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Dep't of Ecology, 88 Wn. 2d 726, 731, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164
(1977). See generally B. ACKERMAN. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CoNsTrrutoN (1977) (analysis of
the many shortcomings of takings law); Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today.
56 WASH. L. REV. 583 (1981) (same).
122. 96Wn.2dat253,635P.2dat 121.
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property rights, and a restriction that is "reasonable" because it is not
sufficiently oppressive to constitute a "taking." 123
Third, even if one does not interpret the concurrence as an incorpora-
tion of takings law but only as an authorization of direct balancing of
initiative and property rights, citizens could still engage in a wide variety
of general free speech activities in shopping centers and on similar forms
of private property. 124 This is because the right of initiative necessarily
incorporates a collateral right to explain and advocate the initiative. The
right to gather signatures in shopping centers would be hollow indeed if
signature gatherers could not explain their proposal to interested shop-
pers. Because one can easily obtain initiative petitions for virtually any
proposition, 125 any ostensible attempt to gather initiative signatures pro-
vides a constitutional shield for all free speech activities that are reason-
ably nondisruptive and related to the subject of the initiative. The result is
thus indistinguishable from that obtained by the plurality's approach, ex-
cept that under Justice Dolliver's approach one's right to engage in gen-
eral free speech activities in shopping centers is not protected unless one
carries an initiative petition.
The concurrence, like the plurality, provides an unsatisfactory justifi-
cation for the Alderwood result. Justice Dolliver's opinion is important,
however, because it emphasizes the initiative provision of the Washing-
ton Constitution. The plurality, by contrast, considered initiative rights
largely as a subset of general free speech rights.126 As Justice Dolliver
noted, the initiative provision does not expressly impose a state action
requirement. Unlike the free speech provision, 127 the initiative provision
has arguably never been construed to entail such a requirement. Whether
123. See generally supra note 119 and cases cited therein (regulations may substantially reduce
property values and yet not constitute a "taking" without just compensation).
124. The effectiveness of speech and initiative rights depends to a large extent on reasonable
access to shopping centers-the de facto downtown business districts of suburban America. See infra
notes 165-68 and accompanying text. Both direct balancing and the traditional public function doc-
trine could also be used to justify reasonable uses of similar forms of private property, although
generally it would be more difficult to justify citizen access to private property other than shopping
centers. See infra notes 170 & 172.
125. To engage in an authorized initiative campaign one need only "file in the office of the
secretary of state five printed or typewritten copies of the measure proposed.., accompanied by the
name and post office address of the proposer, and by an affidavit that the proposer [is a legal voter]."
WASH. REv. CODE § 29.79.010 (1981). Signature gatherers must prepare their own signature forms
by following the format illustrated in WASH. RV. CODE § 29.79. 100 (1981).
126. See 96 Wn. 2d at 239-40, 635 P.2d at 114:
It is undisputed that gathering initiative signatures in some manner, at some place, is a constitu-
tionally guaranteed practice. It is at the core of both the First Amendment and [Washington]
Const. art 1, § 5 .... The right is also specifically guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of
Washington, amendment 7....
127. See infra note 139.
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the court should impose such a requirement, or directly balance initiative
and property rights, is thus an open question that the court must resolve
by reasoned analysis. Whether a reasoned analysis would support the
adoption of some form of direct balancing is examined below as the first
of two alternative justifications for the Alderwood result.
C. Two Alternative Justifications for the Alderwood Result
1. Direct Balancing
If one eliminates the state action and strict scrutiny requirements from
the approach currently followed in cases involving the first amendment to
the United States Constitution, 128 a direct balancing approach results.
Under direct balancing, the court is freed from any preliminary state ac-
tion requirement and proceeds directly to balancing the competing inter-
ests on the merits. The only question is whether a particular restriction on
a constitutional right is justified. As suggested above, this question
should be resolved by applying strict scrutiny to government restrictions
and a lesser degree of scrutiny to private restrictions. 129
Both the Alderwood plurality and the concurrence implicitly adopted a
form of direct balancing. Neither opinion required a meaningful demon-
stration of state action before striking a reasonable balance among the
competing interests involved. Although the plurality ostensibly retained
the state action requirement, the requirement as reformulated is automati-
cally satisfied whenever a balancing of the merits favors the free speech
or initiative rights. 130 The concurrence retained the traditional state action
requirement for the free speech provision, but declared that the initiative
provision did not impose a similar requirement. Thus, both the plurality
and concurrence adopted, in substance, a form of direct balancing. 131
The greatest advantage of direct balancing is its adaptability to chang-
ing circumstances. Under direct balancing, courts are free to adjust the
rules governing conflicts among free speech, initiative and property rights
in light of changing socioeconomic conditions. 132 Two additional
128. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09. In this Note, "direct balancing" refers to a
doctrine which does not contain a state action requirement, but which imposes a lesser degree of
judicial scrutiny on private actions restricting fundamental rights than is applied to similar govem-
ment actions.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
131. There are two major differences between the forms of direct balancing used by the plurality
and concurrence. First, the plurality's form is broader: It balances free speech, initiative, and prop-
erty rights, while the concurrence balances only initiative and property rights. Second, the plurality's
form did not incorporate a police power gloss as did the concurrence.
132. The need for a flexible rule was probably the major motivating force behind the opinions of
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advantages of direct balancing are its internal consistency and simplicity.
If the result that the court should reach, when private actions restrict free
speech and initiative rights, is a reasonable balance between these rights
and private autonomy and property rights, what better rule could be de-
vised than to balance these interests to achieve a reasonable result? Al-
though this rule would initially give judges considerable discretion in
striking a "reasonable" balance, the requirement that judges decide cases
so that they are consistent with precedent should quickly clarify the pre-
cise legal rules. Moreover, the Alderwood plurality ably articulated the
most important factors for courts to consider in such a balancing. 133
The justification for adopting direct balancing can be stated as follows:
(1) State courts, no less than federal courts, 134 are the guardians of our
civil liberties, 135 and should independently interpret state constitutional
provisions to prevent any erosion of these liberties. 136
both the plurality and concurrence. Both opinions recognized that the development of privately
owned shopping centers has substantially eroded the constitutional rights and powers of Washington
citizens. See 96 Wn. 2d at 246, 635 P.2d at 117 (plurality); id. at 253, 635 P.2d at 121 (concurrence).
Both opinions also recognized that the judiciary, as guardian of the Washington Constitution, is duty
bound to interpret the state's highest law so that it currently provides at least the same degree of
protection for individual rights as it did at the time of its adoption. See id. at 238-39, 635 P.2d at
113-14 (plurality); id. at 253, 635 P.2d at 120-21 (concurrence). As compared with the concurrence,
the plurality relied more on a "guardian theory" when alluding to the role of the Washington Su-
preme Court. See id. at 238-39, 635 P.2d at 113-14. See also infra note 135 (general authority
describing the judiciary's special duties as the guardian of civil rights).
133. See 96 Wn. 2d at 244-45, 635 P.2d at 116-17. See also supra note 62 (factors described by
plurality).
134. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
135. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("It is the duty of courts to be watch-
ful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.");
People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 56, 634 P.2d 534, 541, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 465 (1981); Sevems v.
Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 n.9 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d
359, 361 (Fla. 1980) ("The judiciary is in a lofty sense the guardian of the law of the land and the
Constitution is the highest law.") (citation omitted); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wn. 2d
476, 503 n.7, 585 P.2d 71, 87 n.7 (1978); id. at 516, 585 P.2d at 94 ("We must interpret the
constitution in accordance with the demands of modem society or it will be in constant danger of
becoming atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original meaning."); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wn.
2d 75, 92, 558 P.2d 781, 790-91 (1977) (Rosellini, J., dissenting) ("As guardians of the constitu-
tion, I believe it is our duty to make our assumptions in favor of the rights guaranteed therein and to
zealously guard against their erosion."). See also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLMCAL PRocEss 67-68 (1980) (same); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 503-04 (1977) (same). Both the Alderwood plurality and concur-
rence relied on the premise that courts are the guardians of constitutional rights. See supra note 132.
136. See, e.g., Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970) ("[W]e are under a duty,
to develop additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitution if we find
such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional
language."). Accord, People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975).
The Aldervood plurality suggested two separate justifications for going beyond the level of rights
provided by the current United States Supreme Court interpretations of the United States Constitu-
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(2) The proliferation of privately owned shopping centers has eroded
the level of free speech and initiative rights originally contemplated by
the drafters of the Washington Constitution. 137
(3) Direct balancing is the simplest method by which courts can restore
the level of free speech and initiative rights originally contemplated by
the drafters. 138
(4) Direct balancing is consistent with, and arguably required by, the
constitutional text guaranteeing free speech and initiative rights, and no
previous case has held that either provision is circumscribed by a state
action requirement. 39
(5) Other states have adopted direct balancing by holding that similar
constitutional provisions do not entail a state action requirement. 140
(6) Therefore, the Washington Supreme Court should adopt direct bal-
ancing, at least when resolving conflicts between initiative and property
rights. 141
tion. Both justifications are based on the advantages of a federalist system of government. First,
federalism complements the separation of powers by providing "a double security... to the rights of
the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time each will be con-
trolled by itself." 96 Wn. 2d at 237-38, 635 P.2d at 115 (198 1) (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 5 1, at
339 (A. Hamilton & J. Madison) (Modem Library ed. 1937)). Second, federalism gives the people of
the various states the ability to try "novel social and economic experiments." 96 Wn. 2d at 238, 635
P.2d at 115 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)).
137. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 107-09, 132-33 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 171-74 and
accompanying text (comparison of direct balancing with the traditional public function doctrine).
139. Past cases have, in dicta, stated that the Washington Constitution's free speech provision is
equivalent to the first amendment; thus, the Washington provision is arguably circumscribed by a
state action requirement equivalent to that applied to the first amendment by the United States Su-
preme Court. See, e.g., Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn. 2d 51,58, 615 P.2d 440,444
(1980) ("The state equivalent to the First Amendment is Const. art 1, § 5 .... ); Fine Arts Guild,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 74 Wn. 2d 503, 512, 445 P.2d 602, 607 (1968) ("We have, however, in
varying contexts, applied the provisions of Const. art 1, § 5, and the first amendment to the United
States Constitution in pari materia and inferentially interchangeable."). There is also some historical
evidence arguably suggesting that the drafters of the Washington Constitution intended to restrict all
of its rights to rights against state actions. See 96 Wn. 2d at 248-50, 635 P.2d at 118 (Dolliver, J.,
concurring). Nevertheless, there has been no specific holding to that effect. Id. at 240, 635 P.2d at
114 (plurality opinion).
140. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
141. The right of free speech and the power of initiative were identified as the two interests
limiting the shopping center owners' property rights in Alderwvood. The broadest form of direct bal-
ancing would balance both initiative and free speech rights against the owners' property rights. Two
more limited forms of direct balancing would balance either initiative or free speech rights against the
owners' property rights. If the right of free speech is selected as the only interest to be balanced
against the owners' property rights, citizens would have a direct constitutional right to a broader
range of activities in shopping centers than if the power of initiative were selected as the only counter-
vailing interest, because the right of free speech entails a right to gather initiative signatures. See
supra note 126. At the same time, however, the right of initiative entails collateral free speech rights
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There are, however, two important disadvantages to direct balancing.
First, it does not guide lower courts or citizens concerning the specific
kinds of free speech and initiative activities that are "reasonable" uses of
private property. Second, it gives the Washington Supreme Court the ap-
pearance of an "imperial judiciary" which has given itself the authority
to balance the conflicting rights of private citizens, a role that many argue
is constitutionally reserved for the legislature. 142
Neither disadvantage is overriding. First, the "reasonable person" test
is familiar to both the courts and the public as the central principle of tort
law. One could anticipate that initiative and free speech activities would
be protected so long as they did not substantially disrupt the current use to
which privately owned retail property1 43 is dedicated. Moreover, the con-
tours of "reasonableness" in this context should become clearer as the
law is applied in cases in which the reasonableness of free speech or ini-
tiative activities is at issue. 144
Second, the "imperial judiciary" argument begs the question because
it assumes its key premise: that all constitutional rights are circumscribed
by a state action requirement. That premise is hardly self-evident. Even
the United States Constitution contains rights that encompass both state
and private actions. 145 Unlike the United States Constitution, the free
speech provision of the Washington Constitution does not contain a
textual state action requirement. 146 This obvious textual distinction be-
tween the Washington and United States Constitutions suggests strongly
that the Washington provision is not limited by a state action requirement.
Three states with free speech provisions similar to Washington's have in-
terpreted these provisions as extending to some forms of purely private
actions. 147 And even if all of the rights proclaimed by the Washington
Constitution are limited by a state action requirement, the initiative provi-
and initiative petitions concerning any topic can easily be obtained. See supra notes 124-25 and
accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., 96 Wn. 2d at 250-51,254, 635 P.2d at 119-20 (Dolliver, J., concurring).
143. It is unlikely that a court following direct balancing would allow the gathering of initiative
signatures on residential or nonretail business property. Because such property is unlikely to be a
good location for gathering signatures, the gatherer's interest is less compelling. The owners of such
property are also in a much better position to invoke strong privacy interests in their favor. See infra
note 174.
144. The reasonableness of the signature-gathering activities of the Washington Environmental
Council was not at issue inAlderwood. 96 Wn. 2d at 233-34, 635 P.2d at 110.
145. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude...
shall exist within the United States .... .
146. See supra note 53.
147. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980); Com-
monwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981). See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying
text.
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sion is more analogous to a quasi-legislative power than an individual's
right against government action; 148 thus, even if all "rights" are limited
by a state action requirement, the initiative "power" is not.
An analysis of the opinions of the Alderwood plurality and concurrence
reveals that a majority of the justices advocated, in effect, a limited form
of direct balancing in which only initiative and property rights are bal-
anced. 149 Consequently, this form of direct balancing should enjoy stare
decisis status when similar cases are reviewed in Washington's courts.
On the other hand, a majority of the Alderwoodjustices-the concurrence
and dissent-clearly refused to reject the state action requirement for free
speech rights. Thus, if citizens are to enjoy an independent right 150 to
engage in general free speech activities in shopping centers, the only jus-
tification realistically capable of commanding a majority in the Washing-
ton Supreme Court is the traditional public function doctrine.
2. The Traditional Public Function Doctrine
Essentially, the traditional public function doctrine provides that pri-
vate property used to perform a traditional public function should be
treated as government property for purposes of the state action require-
ment. 151 The doctrine thus provides a limited exception to the state action
requirement for property characterized as "public function property."
The underlying rationale for creating a functional exception to the state
action requirement is that an individual's constitutional rights should not
lose judicial protection simply because a private entity acts in place of the
state with respect to a traditional government function. Under this analy-
sis, the inquiry as to where one may exercise constitutional rights does
not focus exclusively on who holds "naked title" to the property, but also
considers the functions performed by the property. 152
148. See supra note 73.
149. Because the plurality was willing to abandon the state action requirement as traditionally
formulated, Alderwood contained four votes for the broad form of direct balancing, in which both
free speech and initiative rights are balanced against property rights. The concurrence indicated will-
ingness to reject any state action requirement for citizens' initiative "powers," but was clearly
unwilling to abandon the requirement for free speech "rights." The four dissenting justices were
unwilling to abandon the state action requirement for either free speech or initiative rights.
150. Under the limited form of direct balancing in which only initiative and property fights are
balanced, citizens would still enjoy an indirect right to engage in free speech activities that related to
their initiative petitions. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
151. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
152. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 324 (1968). See also id. at 315-25 (general analysis of the public forum function performed by
modem shopping centers); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,504-08 (1946) (description of public
functions performed by a company town).
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The traditional public function doctrine is the only justification for the
Alderwood result that was directly supported by Washington case law be-
fore Alderwood. The Washington Court of Appeals in Sutherland v.
Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc., 153 used the traditional public function
doctrine to hold, eleven years before Alderwood, that citizens enjoyed a
constitutional right to gather initiative signatures and engage in general
free speech activities in shopping centers. 154 The Sutherland court relied
heavily on the first amendment to the United States Constitution as inter-
preted in Marsh and Logan Valley. 155 The court also noted, however, that
Washington citizens enjoy parallel free speech rights under both the
Washington and United States Constitutions. 156
Alderwood did not overrule Sutherland. Indeed, the Alderwood plu-
rality observed that: "Citizens of this state have patterned their conduct
on Sutherland, which held, on both federal and state constitutional
grounds, that shopping centers may not deny signature gathering." 157 Al-
though the plurality did not adopt the traditional public function doctrine
as articulated in Sutherland, much of the plurality's opinion would have
supported that approach. First, the plurality noted that state precedent is
not automatically extinguished when federal courts reverse past federal
cases that comprised part of the basis for previous Washington cases. 158
Second, the plurality recognized that "the nature of the public forum has
changed" 159 and that the effectiveness of free speech and initiative rights
would be "greatly reduced" if citizens were denied the right to use the
153. 3 Wn. App. 833,478 P.2d 792 (1970), review denied, 79 Wn. 2d 1005 (1971).
154. Id. at 837-48, 478 P.2d at 794-800. As recognized by the Sutherland court: "There is no
question but that both shopping centers in question do function as business districts in the most com-
plete sense of the word. The roadways and sidewalks of the shopping centers ... do serve as the
functional equivalents of their counterparts in a normal business district.-" Id. at 843, 478 P.2d at
798.
155. See id. at 842, 478 P.2d at 797 ("We have quoted extensively from Marsh and [Logan
Valley] inasmuch as they establish the framework within which the issues presented in this case must
be decided."). For a discussion of Marsh and Logan Valley, see supra notes 18-25 and accompany-
ing text.
156. Id. at 846 n.5,478 P.2d at 799 n.5.
157. 96Wn. 2d at 239,635 P.2d at 113.
158. The Aldernvood plurality stated:
Where controlling federal principles have not changed with the evolution of our society.., and
where our earlier cases have relied in part on overturned federal precedent, we will determine
whether the considerations underlying that precedent continue to have vitality and hence require
its perpetuation as a matter of state law.
96 Wn. 2d at 238-39, 635 P.2d at 113. The plurality's statement flows naturally from several past
Washington cases holding that the rights provided by the Washington Constitution may exceed those
provided by parallel federal provisions. See, e.g., supra note 50 and cases cited therein. See also
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, Inc., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d 341, 346, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854, 859 (1979) ("The fact that those [California cases] cited federal law that subsequently took a
divergent course does not diminish their usefulness as precedent."), affdl 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
159. 96 Wn. 2d at 239, 635 P.2d at 114.
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new public forums of today. 160 Third, and most important, the plurality
accepted the key premise that "[t]he shopping center now performs a tra-
ditional public function .... "161 Under the traditional public function
doctrine that finding is sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement. 162
Neither the concurrence nor the dissent considered the traditional public
function doctrine as a basis for resolving Alderwood. 163
If one accepts the validity of the traditional public function doctrine, 164
it is easy to characterize privately owned shopping centers as public func-
tion property. Traditionally, the public streets and sidewalks of central
business districts provided the most effective public forum for those lack-
ing the money to buy access to the mass media. 65 But as America moved
to the suburbs after World War II, the public forums of downtown busi-
ness districts lost much of their public to the new, privately owned subur-
ban shopping centers. 166 The result is that, today, "people spend more
time in shopping centers than anywhere else, excepting their home and
160. Id. at 246,635 P.2d at 117.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
163. See 96 Wn. 2d at 247-53, 635 P.2d at 118-121 (concurrence); id. at 253-55, 635 P.2d at
121 (dissent).
164. The following argument illustrates the reasoning that might be used: (1) Sutherland adopted
the traditional public function doctrine in Washington, based on federal and state constitutional law;
(2) federal decisions overruling federal precedent do not extinguish the precedential value of state
cases based on both the state and federal constitutions; (3) shopping centers perform a traditional
public function, as recognized in Sutherland and by the Aldervood plurality; therefore (4) the tradi-
tional public function doctrine is still good law in Washington, providing a "'shopping center excep-
tion" to any state action requirement in the Washington Constitution's free speech and initiative
provisions.
165. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,580-81,586 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting):
For many persons who do not have easy access to television, radio, the major newspapers,
and the other forms of mass media, the only way they can express themselves to a broad range of
citizens on issues of general public concern is to picket, or to handbill, or to utilize other free or
relatively inexpensive means of communication. The only hope that these people have to be able
to communicate effectively is to be permitted to speak in those areas in which most of their
fellow citizens can be found ....
...Only the wealthy may find effective communication possible unless we adhere to [the
traditional public function doctrine].
166. By 1966, there were more than 10,000 shopping centers in the United States and Canada,
accounting for approximately 37% of total retail sales. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 324 (1968). By the early 1970's, shopping centers
accounted for 50% or more of retail sales in 21 of the nation's largest metropolitan areas. Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910 n.5, 592 P.2d 341, 347 n.5, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854,
860 n.5 (1979), aff d. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). One source predicts that by 1985 there will be 25,000
shopping centers in the United States alone. Id. (quoting PUBLISHERS WEEKLY. Feb. 1, 1971, at
54-55). The result is that shopping centers are essentially "miniature downtowns," often containing
hotels, apartment houses, office buildings, theaters and churches. Id. (quoting Bus. WK.. Sept. 4,
1971, at 34-38; CHAIN STORE AGE. Sept. 1971, at 4).
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job."1 67 Not surprisingly, "the use of shopping centers [is] the most ef-
fective way to obtain [initiative] signatures. 1 168 Thus, the traditional
public function doctrine provides a viable alternative basis for the result
reached in Alderwood that is directly supported by previous Washington
case law.
If adopted, the traditional public function doctrine would provide a
manageable standard for judicial balancing of free speech, initiative and
property rights. Unlike the direct balancing approach, the traditional pub-
lic function doctrine authorizes only a narrow exception to the state action
requirement. The doctrine applies only to property that performs a tradi-
tional public function, and the types of property that perform traditional
public functions are limited. 16 9 Thus, under the traditional public function
doctrine, the state action requirement would not require most private
property owners to accommodate free speech and initiative activities.
Moreover, if future social, economic or technological developments lead
to unforeseen erosions of speech or initiative rights, the traditional public
function doctrine could be used to expand the permissible scope of judi-
cial balancing in limited, judicially manageable increments. 170
Unfortunately, the traditional public function doctrine is not an ideal
solution. Its major disadvantage is that it imposes a superfluous analytical
superstructure on the courts. The doctrine essentially balances speech,
initiative and property rights on two levels. On the first level, the court
characterizes the type of property involved in a particular case as, for
example, a shopping center, private residence or business office. If a bal-
ance- of the underlying substantive interests generally favors the free
167. 96 Wn. 2d at 238,635 P.2d at 114.
168. Sutherland, 3 Wn. App. at 836, 478 P.2d at 794.
169. The types of traditional public functions are limited. Included among them are the provision
of public forums, police and fire protection, and garbage, sewage, water and electricity services. See
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562 (1972) ("[Functionally, company towns] were built...
with all of the customary services and utilities normally afforded by a municipal or state government:
there were streets, sidewalks, sewers, public lighting, police and fire protection, business and resi-
dential areas, churches, postal facilities, and sometimes schools.") See also supra note 1 (right of
access to streets and parks for use as public forums).
170. For example, the traditional public function doctrine probably would not authorize the
courts to balance free speech, initiative and property rights if an individual attempted to gather initia-
tive signatures in a place of employment which is not also a retail business. This is because the
ordinary workplace is not clearly analogous to the streets and sidewalks of downtown business dis-
tricts, or to any other public forum. However, in situations where large numbers of workers are
employed in a single location, a court might find that the "community areas" of the enterprise (e.g.,
cafeteria and lounge areas) were the functional equivalent of a public forum for the "community" of
employees using a given facility. Indeed, the community areas of several large Washington busi-
nesses (e.g., the central manufacturing plant of the Boeing Company and the central business offices
of Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company) are used by far more people than the central business
district of the company town involved in Marsh v. Alabama (discussed supra in notes 19-21 and
accompanying text).
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speech and initiative rights in the context of the particular category of
property involved, the court is likely to characterize the category of prop-
erty as public function property. This is because, on balance, the property
functions as a public forum. 17 1 On the second level, the court character-
izes the type of speech or initiative activity involved in a particular case.
Specifically, the court evaluates whether the particular speakers or signa-
ture gatherers were engaged in a type of activity that is reasonably nondis-
ruptive to the property's primary use. For example, the court might de-
cide that a speaker's use of a portable amplifier to broadcast a message to
shopping center patrons is unreasonably disruptive; or the court might de-
cide that a center's practice of confining signature gatherers to an area
adjacent to one of several main entrances is unreasonably restrictive.
Yet this complex, two-level analysis will rarely produce a different re-
sult from that produced by direct balancing. 72 Because almost all speak-
ers and signature gatherers will behave in a reasonably nondisruptive
manner, the factors which would lead a court to characterize property as
public function property would usually prove decisive under direct bal-
ancing. 173 Thus, for example, the same factors that would lead a court to
171. Large shopping centers such as Alderwood Mall are certainly public function property
under the traditional doctrine. Alderwood Mall is a relatively large shopping center containing over
one million square feet of retail floor space. The mall is located on 110 acres of land and has over
6,000 parking spaces. Environmental impact statements for the mall projected 22,000 automobiles
entering the mall on an average day in 1978, increasing to 39,600 by 1985. 96 Wn. 2d at 232, 635
P.2d at 110. By comparison, Alderwood Mall is approximately five times larger than the shopping
center involved in Robins v. Pruneyard Shbpping Center. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying
text.
But how should the courts characterize small shopping centers composed of only a few stores, or
very large stores which are not part of a "shopping center"? Because all important public forums are
public function property, any focal point of community activity could easily be characterized as pub-
lic function property. For example, in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981)
(discussed supra in notes 44-48 and accompanying text), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court arguably
characterized a small private college as public function property because it served "in many respect
[sic] as a community center for Allentown[, Pennsylvania] .... "432 A.2d at 1386.
172. One exception might be nonretail business property. One feature unique to the traditional
public function doctrine is its emphasis on property that is "held open to the general public." See
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (quoted supra in note 21); Sutherland v. Southcenter Shop-
ping Center, Inc., 3 Wn. App. 833, 842-44,478 P.2d 792,797-98 (1970), review denied, 79 Wn.2d
1005 (1971). But see supra note 170. Under the direct balancing approach, this factor would have no
direct relevance, although it would be relevant indirectly because of its bearing on the weight of any
privacy interest claimed by the property owner.
173. The difference between the reasoning a court would use under direct balancing and the
reasoning a court would use under the traditional public function doctrine can be illustrated with an
example. Assume that privately owned Property X substantially erodes free speech rights by drawing
people away from traditional public forums, while another parcel of privately owned property, Prop-
erty Y, does not. A conflict arises between a group wishing to collect initiative signatures and the
owners of both parcels of property. If a court followed the traditional public function doctrine, it
would likely hold that Property X performs a public function. This would satisfy the state action
requirement and the court would then decide the case by balancing the competing interests. Regard-
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refuse to characterize a private residence as public function property
would also lead a court following direct balancing to conclude that the
property and privacy rights of a homeowner outweigh the rights of citi-
zens to gather initiative signatures on the homeowner's front lawn. 174
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court in Logan Valley protected free
speech activities in shopping centers by finding that shopping centers are
functionally equivalent to "downtown business blocks." 175 But the rule
of Logan Valley was short lived. Today, the duty of safeguarding free
speech and initiative rights rests with the state courts. The Washington
Supreme Court accepted this responsibility in Alderwood. Yet the ap-
proaches taken by the plurality and concurrence to justify the Alderwood
result are unsatisfactory. The plurality's balancing approach to state ac-
tion is unnecessarily confusing and complex. The plurality adopted direct
balancing in substance, but did so by radically redefining the state action
requirement. Instead, the plurality should have rejected the state action
requirement, and applied different levels of scrutiny to government and
private actions that restrict fundamental rights. The concurrence adopted
a limited form of direct balancing for initiative and property rights, but
based its decision on an analogy to the legislative police power. This
ing Property Y, the court would find that the property does not perform a public function. It would
therefore dismiss the case for lack of state action.
In contrast, if a court followed direct balancing, it would decide both cases by balancing the com-
peting interests, and would probably reach the same result in each case as if it had used the traditional
public function doctrine. Regarding Property X, the court would perform the same balancing on the
merits that a court following the traditional public function doctrine performs after finding a public
function. Regarding Property Y, the lack of a substantial impact on free speech or initiative activities
would almost certainly lead a court using direct balancing to decide in favor of the owner's property
rights when balancing the conflicting interests.
Admittedly, under the traditional public function doctrine, the owner of Property Y could probably
win the case by directed verdict or summary judgment. But under direct balancing this would be
almost as likely because the balance would, by definition, heavily favor the owner's property rights.
174. This fact is an adequate answer to one of the Aldervood dissent's criticisms of the plurality
and concurring opinions. The dissent argued correctly that both opinions, in effect, advocated direct
balancing. The dissent criticized direct balancing by arguing that it does not contain a logical stop-
ping point which would prevent signature gatherers from invading private residential property. 96
Wn. 2d at 254 n. 10, 635 P.2d at 121 n. 1. On the contrary, because private residential property is
closely associated with the important interest of privacy, and commercial property generally held
open to the public is not, there is a clear distinction between residential and commercial or retail
property. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382, 1386 (1982). Cf. State v.
Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615, 629 (1981) (adopting direct balancing, but only for property
held open to the public).
175. 391 U.S. 308, 319, 325 (1968). See generally supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text
(discussion of traditional public function doctrine used in Marsh and Logan Valley).
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analogy is doctrinally incorrect and prevents a fair balancing by incorpo-
rating takings law into the balancing process.
Fortunately, two superior alternatives are available to support the rights
recognized in Alderwood: direct balancing and the traditional public func-
tion doctrine. A limited form of direct balancing constitutes the implicit
holding of Alderwood because this approach incorporates the underlying
structure of a majority of the Alderwood justices-the plurality and the
concurrence. Moreover, direct balancing enjoys the advantages of flexi-
bility, consistency and simplicity. Unfortunately, a majority of the Alder-
wood justices-the concurrence and dissent-refused to reject openly the
state action requirement for the Washington Constitution's free speech
provision. Thus, the Alderwood court was not ready to adopt the broadest
form of direct balancing in which both speech and initiative rights are
balanced against property rights. If citizens are to enjoy an independent
right to engage in reasonably nondisruptive free speech activities in shop-
ping centers, the only justification realistically capable of commanding a
majority on the Washington Supreme Court is the traditional public func-
tion doctrine.
The traditional public function doctrine is the only viable justification
for the Alderwood result which had a foundation in Washington case law
before Alderwood. Moreover, the doctrine would not vitiate the state ac-
tion requirement arguably associated with the Washington Constitution's
free speech provision, but would merely carve out a limited, judicially
manageable exception. The major drawback of this approach is its need-
less complexity. It is essentially direct balancing on two levels: the type
of property, and the type of speech or initiative activities. Because the
weight of the factors considered on the first level is usually decisive
whenever the speaker or signature gatherer acts in a reasonably nondis-
ruptive manner, the doctrine almost invariably generates the same result
as direct balancing. Furthermore, the doctrine would force courts to make
the protection of important rights turn on the somewhat arbitary decision
of what is, or is not, "public function property."
Even with their drawbacks, however, both direct balancing and the tra-
ditional public function doctrine are far superior to the justifications of-
fered by either the Alderwood plurality or concurrence. Both alternatives
deserve careful consideration when the next case regarding conflicting
free speech, initiative and property rights reaches the Washington courts.
James R. Spady
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